

Game-theoretic model of targeted subjectively rational choice

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Abstract: This paper considers the basic problem of theory choice: why and how the individuality of the subject choice leads to deformations of rational choice. It is shown that the patterns of departure of the subject from the "ideal" of rational choice to the subjectively rational are connected with the peculiarities of identifying and understanding external conditions and the properties of their interests (external and internal factors, respectively). External factors associated with the commitments taken by the agent. Internal factors reflect the interests of the subject, induced his needs and ethical system to which he adheres. It is proved that the choice of subject is based on perceptions of the situation purposeful state that reflect various aspects of understanding the subject of purposeful state situation and form an information structure diagrams as the set of possible presentations; the evaluation of satisfaction with the current situation purposeful state of the subject changes the structure of interests of the subject, and he can choose it. It is shown that an agent when making decisions uses three sets of alternatives: control, structural, and identification. This suggests the existence of three virtual parties involved in the selection of appropriate alternatives. Rules for the choice of these alternatives, depending on the subject's understanding of the situation and structure their interests are shaped by compromise and the problem of modeling the choice of acquiring the game contents.

Keywords: reflexive governance, decision-making model, decision making, compromise.